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RECENT DECISIONS

CARRIERS COLLECTION OF FREIGHT CHARGES LIABILITY OF CONSIGNEE WHO RECONSIGNS SHIPMENT The original shipper consigned a

shipment of melons, which was subsequently reconsigned to defendant, who in
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turn reconsigned the shipment to an Indiana firm over the lines of plaintiff
railroad, stating in the diversion order "Protect the through rate. All charges to
follow car." The Indiana firm accepted the shipment and paid freight charges
with a check, which was dishonored on due presentment, the drawer having gone
bankrupt. Held, plaintiff may recover freight charges for the whole trip from
defendant. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Seiter, 61 Ohio App. 497, 22 N. E. (2d)
843 (1939).
An agreement to pay freight charges is ordinarily implied from the consignee's acceptance of property transported under a bill of lading which specifies
they are to be paid by him; in any event, the consignee's acceptance of the shipment renders him prima facie liable for the freight charges by virtue of his
presumed ownership.1 When th(! person named as consignee orders a reconsignment, he must do so either as owner or as a volunteer, in absence of an
express' showing of agency. The courts will not assume this to be the act of a
meddler, and hence they hold the consignee must have accepted the shipment,
the reconsignment being such an exercise of dominion over the shipment as
would be consistent with ownership. The consignee is therefore liable for freight
charges accruing up to the point of reconsignment. 2 As a reconsignor, the consignee is likewise liable for charges for the haul from the point of reconsignment to the new destination, since consignors, impliedly owners of the shipment,
ordinarily become liable for freight charges, in absence of explicit provisions in
the bill of lading to the contrary.8 To escape liability for freight charges, the
consignee must give the carrier sufficient notice that he is not the owner of the
shipment but only an agent.4 It has been held with almost absolute uniformity
that the words "Protect through rate. All charges follow" are insufficient to
relieve the consignee of the implication of ownership and liability for freight ·
charges.5 Even orders to deliver the shipment only on payment of freight by the
new consignee are deemed insufficient to relieve the original consignee of liability
1

9 AM. JuR. 794 (1937); 13 C. J. S. 753 (1939).
9 AM. JuR. 797 (1937); also see the excellent annotation in 105 A. L. R. 1216.
(1936).
3
9 AM. JuR. 792, 797 (1937); 105 A. L. R. 1216 (1936); as to the normal
liability of consignors, see Watkins, "Liability of Consignors and Consignees of Interstate Shipments for Unpaid Freight Charges," 6 MINN. L. REv. 23 (1921).
4
Some courts require very explicit notice of agency here. In Pennsylvania R. R.
v. Lord & Spencer, (Mass. 1936) 3 N. E. (2d) 231, the consignee had notified the
carrier he was only an agent, having no beneficial interest, and at first refused delivery.
Then the consignee reconsigned the shipment without making any mention in the
order of the previous notice of agency. The consignee was held by reconsignment to
render himself liable for all freight charges.
5
Wabash Ry. v. Horn, (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) 40 F. (2d) 905; Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Rothstein, 116 Pa. Super. 156, 176 A. 861 (1935); New York Central R. R. v.
Little-Jones Coal Co., (D. C. Ill. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 337; New York Central R.R.
v. Platt & Brahm Coal Co., 236 Ill. App. 150 (1925); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lord
& Spencer, (Mass. 1936) 3 N. E. (2d) 231; New York Central R. R. v. Brown,
281 Mich. 74, 274 N. W. 715 (1937). Contra: Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. Southern
Coal, Coke & Mining Co., 254 Ill. App. 238 (1929), which distinguishes the Platt
& Brahm case, supra, on the ground that there the consignee purchased f. o. b. point
of shipment, and hence would be estopped to deny liability for freight charges.
2
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for the fr.eight charges. 6 Orders like these are deemed mere instructions for the
benefit of the carrier, not the consignor. The court in the principal case thus
had ample authority for its decision. Unfortunately, however, in 1931 in the
case of Erie R. R. v. Price, 7 this same court had held that the implication of
liability for freight charges by giving a reconsignment order was negatived by
the words "Protect the through rate; all charges follow." 8 The court in the
principal case avoided the authority of the Price case by stating that the cause
of action in the latter case had accrued in 1926 before the Newton amendment
of 1927 to the Interstate Commerce Act 9 had been enacted. Thus the Newton
amendment was held to require a finding for the plaintiff carrier in the principal case. On its face, however, the amended portions would seem to apply
only to the consignee who receives delivery, and to relieve such consignee only
of charges not billed against him at the time of delivery. Two cases 10 have
expressly held that the Newton amendment does not apply at all to the case of
6
New York Central R. R. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, 137
N. E. 324, 24 A. L. R. u6o at u63 (1922); New York Central R. R. v. Frank H.
Buck Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 384, 41 P. (2d) 547 (1935).
1
II Ohio L.Abs. 656 (1931). The reconsignor here was not the consignee under
the original bill of lading, but was the indorsee of the bill of lading and had it in his
possession. That such a person ordinarily becomes liable for freight charges on reconsignment, see C. L. Hils Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 28 Ohio App. 459,
162 N. E. 761 (1928).
8
The court relied principally on Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Central Iron &
Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59, 44 S. Ct. 441 (1924), which holds that delivery of goods
for shipment does not necessarily import an obligation of the shipper to pay freight
charges. There the bill of lading was not signed by the shipper, the consignee was not
the shipper, there was no express agreement by shipper to pay freight, the goods were
sold to consignee under an agreement that the latter pay freight, and the consignee's
transferee received delivery. The shipper was held not primarily liable.
9
44 Stat, L. 1447 (1927), 49 U.S. C. (1934), § 3(2). The controlling portions of the amendment are: "Where carriers ••• are instructed by a shipper or consignor to deliver property ••• to a consignee other than the shipper or consignor, such
consignee shall not be legally liable for transportation charges in respect of the transportation of such property (beyond those billed against him at the time of delivery
for which he is otherwise liable) which may be found to be due after the property
has been delivered to him, if the consignee (a) is an agent only and has no beneficial
title in the property, and (b) prior to delivery of the property has notified the delivering carrier in writing of the fact of such agency and absence of beneficial title, and
in the case of a shipment reconsigned or diverted to a point other than that specified
in the original bill of lading, has also notified the delivering carrier in writing of the
name and address of the beneficial owner of the property. In such cases the shipper or
consignor, or, in the case of a shipment so reconsigned or diverted, the beneficial
owner, shall be liable for such additional charges, irrespective of any provisions to the
contrary in the bill of lading or in the contract under which the shipment was made."
10 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lord & Spencer, (Mass. 1936) 3 N. E. (2d) 231;
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rothstein & Sons, 109 Pa. Super. 96, 165 A. 752 (1933). The
court in the latter case stated that the portions of the amendment referring to reconsignment and diversion do not refer to the liability of a reconsignor, but to the fact
of a reconsignment; the liability defined is still that of the consignee who actually takes
delivery.
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the consignee who reconsigns shipment and does not receive delivery, but only
to cases where the ultimate consignee is a mere agent such as a commission
merchant. In this situation, then, if the carrier has due notice of such fact of
agency, this type of consignee is held liable only for freight and demurrage
charges billed against him at time of delivery and no others.11 On perusal of
the wording of the amendment, it would seem that the latter view is correct and
that the Ohio Court of Appeals misconstrued the ameridment,1 2 even though
such construction was deemed necessary to attain the result most other courts
are reathing. It will be interesting to observe in the future the case in which
a consignee reconsigns with orders to let the charges follow the car, and where
no interstate shipment is involved in any of the successive consignments, and
then to note whether the Ohio court will feel constrained to follow Erie R. R.
v. Price, or whether it will expressly overrule, or treat as overruled, that case.18

11 Such cases were New York Central & Hudson River R. R. v. York & Whitney
Co., 256 U. S. 406, 41 S. Ct. 509 (1920); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Titus, 216 N. Y.
17, 109 N. E. 857 (1915), noted 27 HARV. L. REV. 83 (1913). In these cases the
carrier by mistake collected less charges than were actually due. After the commission
merchants had remitted the proceeds of the sale to the consignors, the commission
merchants were held liable for the previously unknown balance due on freight charges.
and the courts cited here held the commission merchants liable for such balance irrespective of contract and as a matter of law. It is probably this situation the Newton
amendment was intended to correct.
12 In Pennsylvania R. R. v. United Collieries, Inc., 59 Ohio App. 540, 18 N. E.
(2d) 1000 (1938), which had facts identical to those of the principal case and was
decided the same way, the Ohio court apparently had such construction of the Newton
amendment in mind, for it disregarded the authority of cases reaching a contrary result
on the ground that they were decided before the enactment of that Amendment. In this
case, however, Erie R. -R. v. Price, II Ohio L. Abs. 656 (1931), was not brought
to the consideration of the court.
18 In the principal case, the court used language indicating that it no longer
approved the result of the Price case and deemed it contrary to the best authority;
it is not at all unlikely that in the future in a proper case, the court will expressly
overrule the Price case.

